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In a time of economic crises and scandals resulting in public
skepticism of corporate operations, it is natural to focus on whether
companies are serving or thwarting the public good. Moreover, it is
natural for various parties to explore how to incentivize companies to
contribute positively to society and to coalesce around something like
a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) movement, even though the
exact boundaries of such a movement may not be fully defined. Thus,
it is not surprising that government regulators, the private sector,' and
academics2 all have focused on CSR.3
* Professor, The University of Alabama School of Law. I previously
served as Special Counsel in the Division of Market Regulation of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, where my work included
international matters. I would like to thank Dean Mark Brandon, my
colleagues on the faculty, and the Alabama Law School Foundation for their
generous support of my research. I also thank the editors of the South Carolina
Journal of International Law and Business Law and participants in its
symposium on Corporate Social Responsibility (hereinafter "Symposium").
I See, e.g., Devin Thorpe, Why CSR? The Benefits of Corporate Social
Responsibility Will Move You to Act, FORBES (May 18, 2013),
http://onforb.es/13D6bfr; Corporate Social Responsibility, CISCO,
http://csr.cisco.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
2 See, e.g., Corporate Responsibility Initiative, HARv. KENNEDY SCH.,
http://www.hks.
harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/programs/csri (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
One of the great benefits of this Symposium is that it does not focus
too much on old CSR literature and debates about issues, such as the term's
exact meaning. Ultimately, such questions are not necessary to move the
dialogue forward, and may even cause confusion. For example, Professor
Karin Buhmann usefully relayed how in Europe strict focus on the meaning of
CSR and whether, by definition, it constitutes only voluntary corporate action
may put ideas in boxes that curtail the freedom of policymakers to move
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In this article, I seek to add to the ongoing CSR dialogue by
analyzing the relative efficacy of certain government regulations
aimed at improving the social behavior of companies. More
specifically, I examine the use of U.S. financial regulation as a means
to influence the behavior of U.S. companies abroad. The tradition of
using extraterritorial financial regulation-regulation related to
activities outside of U.S. borders-is longstanding. Accordingly,
extraterritorial financial regulation provides an interesting case study
for broader regulatory evaluation and might offer hints about more
optimal regulatory schemes in other nations and sectors as well. '
To evaluate the effects of regulation on companies operating
across borders, it is useful to categorize different types of regulation.
For instance, Professor Peter Muchlinski, in studying multinational
forward effectively in helping firms become better citizens. Karin Buhmann,
Remarks at the South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Symposium: Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets (Feb. 6,
2015).
4 Financial regulation is certainly not the only type of regulation that
might be employed to influence CSR, depending on how one defines CSR.
For example, as the U.S. government authorized investments by U.S. persons
in Burma, the U.S. Department of State also issued the Reporting
Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma. See Reporting
Requirements, EMnASSY OF THE U.S., RANGOON, BURMA,
http://burma.usembassy.gov/reporting-requirements.html (last visited Nov.
16, 2015). Such actions can be viewed as a general part of the human rights
program of the United States. See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights & Labor, U.S. Government Approach on Business and Human
Rights, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV (May 1, 2013), http://www.humanrights.gov/u.s.-
govemment-approach-on-business-and-human-rights. However, this article
focuses on financial regulation, not only because it is my area of expertise for
which I was called on by the Symposium organizers, but also because of the
overall importance of financial regulation, including its indirect relation to
other areas of the law. For example, given the broad nature of financial
regulatory disclosures, they may include a vast variety of subjects from
corporate governance to items not as purely corporate, such as environmental
practices. See Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition
and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures,
Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 18, 1989)
(exploring disclosure of trends with example of Environmental Protection
Agency designation of person as potentially responsible party under
Superfund). Thus, an analysis of financial regulation potentially offers broad
insights.
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enterprises, usefully identified how there may be a variety of sites of
regulation including self-regulation, non-governmental organization
regulation, national regulation, bilateral regulation, regional
regulation, and multilateral regulation. ' Moreover, Professor
Muchlinski usefully distinguishes "home" and "host" country
regulation- respectively, regulation from a company's country of
origin as opposed to the rules proffered by the country abroad where
the company seeks to operate.' In this article, I similarly seek to draw
on such distinctions by examining the relative efficacy of U.S.
regulation as home country regulation that seeks to influence the
behavior of its companies abroad, which exists in a world where other
regulatory alternatives may be available. At the outset, it is useful to
note that one might alternatively posit that host country regulations
might be a more direct way than such U.S. home regulation to affect
company behavior in the host jurisdiction's boundaries.
Initially, it also is useful to state what I do not seek to accomplish
in this article. While this article may be viewed as a critique of home
country regulation, it is not within this article's scope to declare that
all extraterritorial regulation is always inappropriate.' The purpose of
this article is more nuanced. I seek to suggest how, given certain
inherent limits on the efficacy of some types of home regulation, it is
prudent to think more broadly about the merits of such home
regulation in contrast to possible regulatory alternatives. Such an
endeavor is especially useful since regulatory resources are not
unlimited.'
Accordingly, I proceed in the following fashion: After this
introduction in Part I of the article, I continue in Part II to identify how
certain U.S. financial regulation might be characterized as an effort to
achieve CSR. In Part III, I explore limits on the efficacy of utilizing
See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW
112-21 (2d ed. 2007).
6 See generally id. at 125-470.
Indeed, theories for bases for extraterritorial regulation and jurisdiction
are multiple and subject to their own debates. See MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 241-66 (1988).
8 Governments face factors from limited financial revenues for
expenditures on regulatory programs to political realities shaping the
allocation of regulatory resources. Therefore, a transparent analysis of
possible shortcomings of traditional regulatory techniques, such as
extraterritorial programs, as well as the introduction of alternatives, is critical.
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U.S. regulation in this fashion. In Part IV, I offer alternative regulatory
schemes that might incentivize CSR more effectively. Finally, in Part
V, I conclude with a summary of my assessment.
II. U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATION AND CSR
At first glance, U.S. financial regulation might seem unrelated to
international CSR, because, in name, its subject is finance and it
references domestic law. 9 However, students of U.S. financial
regulation recognize the scope of its effects is much broader. Financial
regulation, especially securities regulation, is interested in activities
beyond stock market trading. For example, as I have explained in my
prior capacity as U.S. Reporter on Company Law and the Law of
Succession for the 2014 Congress of the International Academy of
Comparative Law, federal securities regulation may affect corporate
governance in significant ways."o And, of course, how a company is
managed may be closely linked to whether it engages in socially
positive or negative activities. The wide presence of U.S. firms,
operating in U.S. capital markets and subject to U.S. financial
regulation, that also operate abroad, increases the chance that U.S.
domestic law might appear in effect in other jurisdictions.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to provide some examples of
U.S. financial regulation that might affect CSR as it relates to
companies' operations in foreign jurisdictions. The first example is
the payment provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). "
As discussed below, the FCPA seeks to discourage bribery, including
by certain companies, of foreign officials in other countries.'2 The
payment provisions are especially interesting as they directly forbid
certain activities abroad.13 The second example is the U.S. regulatory
9 Of course, this is not to say the activities described below do not take
place in a broader tradition of international law in the United States. See
generally MARK WESTON JANIS, THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004).
10 Kenneth M. Rosen, Company Law and the Law ofSuccession, 62 AM.
J. COMP. L. 387, 400-01 (2014) (discussing proxy voting and federalization of
certain legal issues).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
12 Id.
13 Id.
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framework for disclosure. Disclosure is of interest as it might expose
the socially positive and negative operations of companies abroad.
These effects may be more indirect through shaming bad behavior and
highlighting good behavior, rather than mandating or prohibiting
behavior directly.14
A. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
The FCPA is a statute that allows the United States Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) or the United States Department of
Justice (DOJ) to pursue violators of the statute.'I While some might
not classify an anti-bribery statute as securities law or financial
regulation, the FCPA's history and SEC's involvement should
disavow this conclusion. Judge Stanley Sporkin, former Director of
the SEC's Division of Enforcement, greatly enlightened the scheme's
institution in a symposium related to the FCPA's twentieth
anniversary.16
Judge Sporkin tells the fascinating tale of how the statutory
scheme finds its origin in the Watergate hearings and the perhaps
lesser-appreciated pursuit of claims of inappropriate corporate
contributions to President Richard Nixon's re-election campaign. "
While at the SEC in the 1970s, given his interest in accounting, Judge
Sporkin had a staffer conduct an informal inquiry into how
14 These certainly are not the only possible examples of extraterritorial
financial regulation. Nor does what follows constitute a detailed discussion of
the specific rules and regulations in these two areas. Rather, these two
examples hopefully are useful as intuitively comprehensible by those
attending this interdisciplinary Symposium, including individuals from
outside law schools, such as the business scholars and firm leaders present, as
an entry point to thinking about financial regulation and how extraterritorial
financial regulation, in particular, might take different forms.
1 The SEC's jurisdiction relates to many of the most significant
companies in the United States as it has jurisdiction over certain "issuers" of
securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2012). DOJ jurisdiction goes more broadly
to "domestic concerns" which may include various entities and individual
persons. Id. § 78dd-2(a).
16 Stanley Sporkin, The Worldwide Banning of Schmiergeld: A Look at
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on its Twentieth Birthday, 18 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 269 (1998).
17 Id. at 271.
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corporations might document these payments as part of their
accounting activities." Upon learning how illicit payments could be
concealed through mislabeling, the SEC discovered corporations
could also use secret funds to bribe foreign government officials and
eventually began a formal investigation. " Ultimately, the SEC
discovered large amounts of problematic payments, and SEC
enforcement cases began.20 Given the seemingly widespread nature of
the problem, the SEC sought a new regulatory fix, resulting in a
voluntary disclosure program for dubious payments.2 ' Hundreds of
companies participated in the program.22
Eventually, Senator William Proxmire queried whether legislation
might help.23 Judge Sporkin's advice preceded the first part of the FCPA,
which requires internal control and books and records provisions. 24
Senator Proxmire also wanted to go further, and Congress added payment
provisions to the FCPA which simply barred certain bribes.25 Thus, in
addition to requiring accounting of payments, the FCPA added payment
provisions. Accordingly, a violation could occur if parties covered by the
statute use "interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer... of
anything of value to" certain foreign officials and others to influence or
induce such persons "in order to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining
business .... "26
The above payment provisions can clearly be characterized as a
CSR regulation with potential extraterritorial effects. By its terms, the
statute does not limit itself to bribes on U.S. soil, thus making it
noteworthy in banning actions that could include activities abroad.27
Moreover, while a universal definition for CSR might not exist, it is
fair to say the FCPA incentivizes CSR behavior. While some might
view the FCPA's bribery ban as a mere prohibition of certain behavior,
18 Id. at 271-72.
19 Id. at 272.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 272-73.
22 Id. at 273.
23 Id. at 273-74.
24 Id. at 275.
25 Id.
26 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (2012).
27 Id. § 78dd-1.
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an alternative characterization is that the FCPA seeks to encourage
companies operating abroad to support upright, rather than corrupt,
officials to improve the society in which they operate.
Certainly, this is not to discount the potential ability of the FCPA
accounting provisions to affect CSR. U.S. officials may pursue FCPA
violations for improper accounting, thus causing distress to the
offender. 28 However, the accounting provisions aim to affect
company behavior abroad may operate differently, including operating
as a preemptive shaming mechanism,29 as suggested below in the
discussion of disclosure regulation.30
B. DISCLOSURE REGULATION
Another example of U.S. financial regulation that might operate
to promote good behavior and CSR by companies abroad is the U.S.
securities law disclosure system." As illustrated by the early portion
of the FCPA story above, financial regulators such as the SEC, are
keenly interested in forcing companies to provide accurate, properly
labelled information about their various activities." It is useful to see
how the broader SEC disclosure program might be used as a regulatory
vehicle to promote CSR abroad, even if it operates more indirectly than
affirmative bans on activities.
Disclosure requirements for public companies under the federal
securities laws33 may be extensive34 and can arise in a variety of
28 Id. § 78m; see also Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt-practices-act
(last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
29 In other words, one may not want to engage in questionable activity at
all if there is a likelihood it must be disclosed.
30 See infra Section II.B.
31 Securities law disclosure is an important part of financial regulation.
However, as noted above, it is not the only type of disclosure or regulation that
might be employed to encourage CSR. See supra note 4. However, it is useful
as an example for the discussion in this article.
32 See supra Section II.A.
13 It is worth noting that while the article does not focus on it, additional
state law disclosure requirements might exist as well.
34 Indeed, U.S. lawyers have suggested at times that the extensive nature
of U.S. disclosure requirements and their effects on securities offerings should
likely be of interest to foreign entities that might trigger those requirements
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contexts. For instance, such requirements may arise in the context of
a particular event, such as a securities offering." A company offering
securities may be penalized for failing to make certain disclosures
during the registration process.36 Additionally, a company may be
obliged to report on a periodic basis3 7 not necessarily linked to an
event like an offering."
Even those unfamiliar with the details of securities laws may be
familiar with annual reports and other documentation many public
U.S. companies are required to release.39 When exploring the details
of U.S. securities regulation, a variety of complex laws, forms, and
rules reveal themselves in relation to such disclosures. 40 Some
companies must make annual reports,41 quarterly reportS,42 and reports
in the interim of other significant occurrences.43 The content of these
through contacts with the U.S. See, e.g., EDWARD F. GREENE, ET AL., I U.S.
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS §
8.07 (4th ed. 1998).
35 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 67 (5th
ed. 2005).
36 See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
37 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. § 78a
et seq. (2012).
38 Throughout the years, the existence of various disclosure obligations
has caused the SEC to attempt to create a more integrated system. See, e.g.,
HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK, §
3:3 (2014).
3 See generally, Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 471-75 (4th ed. 2001).
40 See HAZEN, supra note 35, at 4-6.
41 Form 10-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (June 26, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/forml 0-k.pdf
42 Form 10-Q, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, (Sept. 2, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form l0-q.pdf.
43 Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N (Aug. 10, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/
about/forms/form8-k.pdf; see also Jennifer B. Lawrence & Jackson W.
Prentice, The SEC Form 8-K: Full Disclosure or Fully Diluted? The Quest for
Improved Financial Market Transparency, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 913
(2006) (noting increase in 8-K filings).
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reports is further defined through regulatory instructions on presenting
financial" and other information.45
The types of information that need to be disclosed can increase
over time. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted after the
Enron scandal, 46 is noteworthy for Section 404, which requires
corporate management discussion of internal controls. 47 It is
important to note that disclosure is not necessarily limited to
information about a company's activities within U.S. borders.
Accordingly, a company engaged in CSR activities may, where
appropriate, include descriptions of activities consistent with CSR it
engages in abroad as part of its otherwise required disclosures. In this
way, disclosure might be viewed as positive reinforcement of good
behavior as it offers an opportunity to demonstrate that the company
has a social conscience. Perhaps even more interesting, a company
engaging in activities inconsistent with CSR would need to disclose
such activities if the regulations otherwise require disclosing that type
of activity. While this might not be the direct prohibition of negative
activities listed in the FCPA's payment provisions, disclosing such
activities may indirectly result in shaming the company, which might
cause the company to reconsider continuing anti-CSR behavior that
must be disclosed.4 8
4 See Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2015).
4 See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2015).
46 See generally Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for
Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097-138 (2003)
(discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
47 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012); see also Peter
Feltman, SEC's Atkins Discusses Disclosure Issues, CCH SEC FILINGS
INSIGHT, Nov. 8, 2005.
48 As Commentator, Joey Lee of Fordham Law School noted, disclosure
rules, as they proliferate, can get to specific subjects such as the Dodd Frank
Act's provisions focusing on disclosure related to conflict minerals. He further
noted the possibility of activists utilizing such information made available
under various disclosure regimes. See Joey Lee, Remarks at the South
Carolina Journal of International Law and Business Symposium: Corporate
Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets (Feb. 6, 2015). As I noted during
the live Symposium, it is an interesting question how disclosure may have both
positive and negative effects if only some are required to disclose but not
others. This may happen if disclosure regimes are not close to equivalent in
different jurisdictions. This partial disclosure may be misleading in some
50 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 12.1
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Useful literature has been developing in a variety of subjects,
including criminal law, about the powers and weaknesses of shaming
as a legal device. The effectiveness of shaming may depend on the
cultural setting of the exercise.4 9 The subject is emerging as especially
significant in the financial sector in the wake of the financial crisis as
experts seek to struggle with how to fix the global economic system.0
Regardless of one's position on the efficacy of shaming, it must be
acknowledged at this point in the article that the U.S. regulatory
scheme largely focuses on the power of disclosure and its behavioral
effects. This is linked to the economic underpinnings of the securities
laws positing that companies' market behavior, good and bad, will
become known and reflected in their securities prices, hence
incentivizing better behavior. Indeed, this is why the efficient market
hypothesis positing efficient absorption of information is significant.'
Alternatively, to state things more dramatically, the belief that
disclosure makes a difference by incentivizing better market behavior
likely fuels continued citation of the view expressed by former
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis that "Sunlight is said to be the
best of disinfectants . . . ."52
Given the fact that U.S. financial regulation has been used in
attempt to shape extraterritorial CSR activities, it next becomes
necessary to evaluate the limits of U.S. home regulation as a CSR-
motivating tool.
instances. Accordingly, norm migration, discussed later in this article,
becomes more significant.
49 See Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings ofShame Implications for Legal
Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 645 (1997).
50 See Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of "Name-and-
Shame" in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1083
(2012).
s' See generally JAMES D. COX, ET AL., SECURITIEs REGULATION CASES
AND MATERIALS 91-104 (7th ed. 2013) (discussing theory's use and its
arguable strength and weaknesses).
52 See LoUIs BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How BANKERS
USE IT (1913); see also, Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC
Announces "21st Century Disclosure" Initiative to Fundamentally Rethink the
Way Companies Report and Investors Acquire Information (June 24, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-1 19.htm (quoting SEC Chairman
Cox noting continued relevance of sunlight notion).
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III. POTENTIAL LIMITS ON EXTRATERRITORIAL REGULATION'S
EFFICACY
As a practical matter, U.S. financial regulation appears
substantially engaged in CSR behavior abroad. That fact merits closer
evaluation of the efficacy of U.S. financial regulation as an
extraterritorial regulatory tool. Accordingly, this part of the article
offers several potential limits of this regulatory scheme: legal limits,
practical limits, political limits, and other efficacy limits. As
mentioned in the introduction, it is not my aim to call for an end to all
extraterritorial regulation. Rather, understanding possible limits on
the efficacy of U.S. regulations in this area is required to engage in a
more nuanced evaluation of U.S. financial regulation as a regulatory
tool versus other tools.5 3
A. LEGAL LIMITS
First, there are possible legal limits on the efficacy of
extraterritorial U.S. regulation. Simply put, during the last several
years, the United States Supreme Court has become increasingly
skeptical of such extraterritorial efforts, including in financial
regulation. Justice Scalia's opinion in Morrison v. National Australia
Bank Ltd54 illustrates this increased skepticism. This case examined
whether Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)" was limited in its potential extraterritorial effect.
sa Indeed, evaluation of possible limits of extraterritorial financial
regulation may even provide a roadmap for advocates of such regulation
moving forward. The aim of this article is to catalogue potential limits. An
advocate could then utilize those limits to analyze different types of
extraterritorial financial regulation and determine if the limits were more or
less problematic for each different type. Thus, one might better compare
relative regulatory efficacy even within the specific world of extraterritorial
tools. As I discussed with other participants during the Symposium, in some
instances, one regulation, such as disclosure, might ultimately be viewed as
preferable to other more intrusive forms of extraterritorial activities. Kenneth
Rosen, Remarks at the South Carolina Journal of International Law and
Business Symposium: Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets
(Feb. 6, 2015).
54 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
ss Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
52 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 12.1
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Section 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the Exchange Act, is
tremendously significant, especially because it allows for private
rights of action. 6 In Morrison, foreign nationals from Australia
brought a suit under Section 10(b) and other securities law provisions,
claiming problematic behavior by a mortgage-servicing company,
Homeside Lending. " Although Homeside Lending was
headquartered in the U.S., a foreign company, National Australia
Bank, owned Homeside Lending." National Australia Bank, whose
ordinary securities only trade abroad, previously touted Homeside and
allegedly knew of problems with Homeside's financial models." The
Court held that foreign plaintiffs do not have a cause of action under
Section 10(b) against the U.S. or foreign defendants arising out of
problems in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.'
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia drew on his perception
of an American legal tradition that absent clear Congressional intent
otherwise, U.S. statutes do not apply beyond U.S. territory.' Indeed,
Justice Scalia appeared to chasten the Second Circuit for its seeming
belief that, in the wake of silence on the matter of extraterritorial
application, courts should determine whether Congress intended the
statute to apply extraterritorially.62 Justice Scalia also discounted the
petitioners' citation of Homeside's problematic activities occurring in
the U.S. that might render the case not extraterritorial.63 He instead
concluded that under the Exchange Act, the relevant site of activity for
territorial/extraterritorial analysis was the site where securities sales
occurred, which presumably makes trading on foreign exchanges more
relevant."
However, the entire Court did not fully embrace Justice Scalia's
opinion. Justice Breyer concurred in part and in the judgment,
56 See id.
17 561 U.S. at 250-53.
58 Id.
s9 Id Interestingly, it appears that American Depository Receipts
representing such shares did trade in the United States. See id
64) Id at 273.
61 See id. at 255.
62 See id. at 255-61.
63 See id. at 266.
6 See id. at 266-73.
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focusing on the circumstances here involving registered securities on
a foreign exchange." Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg,
concurred in the judgment and seemingly preferred the more
evaluative approach of the issue used by the Second Circuit.66 For
purposes however, of this article, which does not seek to state the
doctrinally superior reasoning, the difference in reasoning seems less
significant than the appearance of what might be a trend of skepticism
on the extraterritoriality issue.67
65 See id. at 273-74.
66 See id. at 273-86.
67 Along similar lines, this article does not discount the possibility that
future legal arguments might re-characterize some activities abroad as not
actually problematic outside U.S. borders, and thus impermissibly
extraterritorial as contemplated by the Morrison opinion by Justice Scalia.
Indeed, Congress potentially possesses the ability to legislatively claw back
jurisdiction when it chooses. Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act adds
some thoughts on extraterritorial jurisdiction. For instance, that provision
amends Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, so that:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have
jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted
by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation
of the antifraud provisions of this title involving.. .conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction
occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors; or... conduct occurring outside the United States
that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United
States.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. §
78aa). How fully this claws back from Justice Scalia's opinion will only be
seen over time as the statute is applied and further tested in courts. However,
regardless of the statute's impact, the trend of skepticism by the Court remains,
at least raising warning signs of what court imposed roadblocks other
extraterritorial legislation might face. This is further discussed in the story of
the Arabian American Oil case below. Moreover, Professor Virginia Harper
Ho further reinforced this point during the Symposium, noting the Court's
similar blow to trying to change corporate behavior regarding human rights
using the Alien Tort Claims Act in the Kiobel case. Virginia Harper Ho,
Remarks at the South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Symposium: Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets (Feb. 6,
2015). In that case, the Court utilized the presumption against
54 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 12.1
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The Court previously supported the view that without clear
Congressional intent otherwise, a U.S. statute's reach should be
limited to U.S. territory in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.6 8 In
that case, the Court rejected the extraterritorial application of Title
VII's anti-discrimination provisions abroad.69 Justice Scalia began a
section of his opinion in Morrison by citing Arabian American Oil,
quoting an earlier case, Foley Brothers v. Filardo, stating:
[I]t is a "longstanding principle of American law
'that legislation of Congress, unless contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."'o
As in Morrison, all members of the Court did not agree with the
holding in Arabian American Oil because of questions about
interpretations of the earlier case, Foley Brothers. " Congress
ultimately overruled Arabian American Oil by amending the statute to
clarify its extraterritorial intent.72 However, in doing so, it can be
argued that the statute now implicitly recognizes the need for clarity
before extraterritorial application. Notwithstanding some dissent, the
clarity point has now migrated through decades ofjurisprudence.
At a minimum, this suggests that any extraterritorial efforts to
regulate CSR behavior abroad might be subject to limits absent
statutory clarity on the issue. Such legal uncertainty constitutes a
possible limit on the efficacy of such efforts. Given the numerous risks
associated with international business that might otherwise support the
world economy, it is fair to question whether these legal limits on U.S.
financial regulation should inspire thoughts on alternative techniques.
extraterritoriality to ATS claims. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
68 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
69 See id.
70 Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (quoting Arabian American Oil, 499 U.S. at
248).
71 See Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 260-78 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the majority's recasting of the presumption against extraterritoriality
as a "clear statement rule").
72 Civil Rights Act of 1991§ 109, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 109, 105 Stat.
1071 (1991).
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Moreover, regulations that have indeterminate ultimate legal effect
may have less effect on behavior as well.
B. PRACTICAL LIMITS
In addition to legal limits on using U.S. financial regulation to
inspire CSR, there may be practical limits. The behavioral impact of
financial regulation might be tied to the ability and desire to enforce
that regulation when rules are violated. U.S. financial regulation's
efforts to encourage CSR abroad may face several potential practical
speed bumps.
1. DEFINING VIOLATIONS
It is useful to return to the FCPA story to see the first practical
difficulty: defining the violation. Punishing violations, and possibly
deterring future violations, may be more difficult if it is unclear what
constitutes a violation. Even a casual reading of the elements of an
FCPA violation, noted above, 7 reveals the possible debates over
whether those elements are present. For example, what does it mean
to make a payment "corruptly?"74
The practicality of establishing the elements of a successful case
is illustrated by case law. For instance, the Eighth Circuit grappled
with the statute in United States v. Liebo.5 In that case, the defendant
appealed his conviction for violating the FCPA's bribery provisions
under factual circumstances the Court likened to a "modem fable."76
Under the alleged facts, alongside the course of securing a contract for
a foreign company, items appeared to change hands, including money
and honeymoon airplane tickets. 77 Even after acknowledging the
lower court's jury instruction adequately defined "corruptly" and that
sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find some exchanges were
done corruptly, the Eighth Circuit still held that "the district court
clearly abused its discretion in denying Liebo's motion for a new
73 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
74 See id.
7 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
76 Id.at 1309.
7 See id. at 1309-10.
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trial."" In light of what the Eighth Circuit felt was not necessarily
overwhelming evidence on the "corruptly" issue, newly discovered
evidence related to the affair still required a new trial." The presence
of evidentiary issues in FCPA cases raises other practical problems
discussed below.so
One might question if such a lack of clarity between permissible
and impermissible behavior is an outlier. The outlier notion may be
undermined somewhat by the need to provide guidance on how the
FCPA applies decades after its promulgation. In 2012, the DOJ and
SEC released A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act." The DOJ explains:
It is the product of extensive efforts by experts at
DOJ and SEC, and has benefited from valuable
input from the Departments of Commerce and
State. It endeavors to provide helpful information to
enterprises of all shapes and sizes-from small
businesses doing their first transactions abroad to
multi-national corporations with subsidiaries
around the world. The Guide addresses a wide
variety of topics, including who and what is
covered by the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting
provisions; the definition of a "foreign official";
what constitute proper and improper gifts, travel
and entertainment expenses; the nature of
facilitating payments; how successor liability
applies in the mergers and acquisitions context; the
hallmarks of an effective corporate compliance
program; and the different types of civil and
criminal resolutions available in the FCPA context.
On these and other topics, the Guide takes a multi-
faceted approach, setting forth in detail the statutory
requirements while also providing insight into DOJ
78 See id. at 1310-14.
7 Id.
80 See infra Section III.B.2.
* See The FCPA Guide, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, (Nov. 2, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guidance/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2014).
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and SEC enforcement practices through
hypotheticals, examples of enforcement actions and
anonymized declinations, and summaries of
applicable case law and DOJ opinion releases.
82
The guide is an admirable effort to help clarify what is permissible.
However, the years it took before the DOJ and SEC felt comfortable
issuing the guidance, as well as the volume of the report itself, at over
100 pages with indices," also might indicate that perfect clarity does
not exist. Beyond the FCPA, it is also worth noting that a remarkable
amount of guidance exists for the SEC disclosure program. Further, it
is presumably more challenging to issue guidance on what materials
should be disclosed about the foreign activities of which the SEC is
less aware.
Again, these practical problems do not justify ending any role of
U.S. financial regulation; rather, these problems suggest that the
ultimate efficacy of such efforts may be limited. Deterrence may be
harmed when those subject to regulation have trouble seeing whether
something constitutes wrongdoing. And, ultimately proving cases in
courts when violations are unclear also may present difficulties.
2. OTHER PROSECUTORIAL ISSUES RELATED TO EXTRATERRITORIAL
BEHAVIOR
The issue of defining violations is not the only possible practical
problem of enforcing U.S. law extraterritorially. It is worth briefly
mentioning some basic concerns encountered in transnational
enforcement. First, enforcement generally requires discovering
possible violations. While not impossible to discover illicit activity
abroad, the monitoring and surveillance capabilities of the U.S.
government of financial matters may be more limited outside of U.S.
ternitory.84
Second, even when possible violations are detected, it may be
challenging to investigate and bring possible offenders and evidence
related to those violations back to the United States. Bringing back
82 Id.
83 See U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012).
84 Ultimately, this may reinforce the benefits of more local involvement
on CSR discussed in Part IV infra.
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evidence may be challenging because it may include live witnesses
and other documentation that are hard to secure.
Third, even when cases are successfully prosecuted, it may still be
difficult to affect behavioral changes and to secure assets to pay fines
in a foreign jurisdiction. Certainly, some modem international
litigation tools exist that might help ameliorate these problems for
international dispute resolution. Moreover, international agreements
might help with service of process, securing evidence, or enforcing
judgments. But even if these aids exist, government use, may be
limited or controversial, as opposed to use by private parties." A
government wanting help may need to negotiate with other
governments to get assistance. For example, they may be able to
secure memoranda of understandings with other nations." Of course,
such processes may depend on the goodwill of other nations to
cooperate and to subject themselves to U.S. extraterritorial reach,
which may not be as likely given political realities explored below."
3. LOOPHOLES AS PRACTICAL LIMITS
A final possible practical limit might be described as the use of
loopholes in efforts to affect activities abroad. If home country
regulation is viewed as too invasive, the resulting behavioral
modification may be that companies attempt to remove themselves
from their home countries to avoid those countries' regulatory
schemes. For instance, new business organization structures might be
established to engage in activities abroad in entities unregistered in the
United States.
The danger of businesses separating from home jurisdictions in
order to avoid regulation recently drew attention in the tax context. 88
Concerns have been raised about schemes to avoid tax effects in the
United States.89 As a result, recent efforts have been made as well to
85 See, e.g., MuCHLUNSK, supra note 5, at 160-74.
86 See, e.g., id. at 170-71.
87 See infra Part III.C.
88 See John D. McKinnon & Damien Paletta, Obama Administration
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close such loopholes, which is illustrated by efforts regarding tax
inversions.90 These solutions are yet to be fully tested;91 but at a
minimum, the loophole problem, if capable of correction, certainly
will take resources and time to do so.
C. POLITICAL LIMITS
Returning to the issue of politics, both foreign and domestic
politics present potential limits on the efficacy of extraterritorial
regulation.92 Accordingly, it is useful to briefly explore some of the
political economy of such regulations.
1. FOREIGN POLITICS
As alluded to above, the ultimate success of home nation
extraterritorial schemes to improve company behavior might be
affected by the cooperation, or lack thereof, by officials of the host
jurisdictions. One should not assume that the benefits of CSR induced
90 See id. It is not the purpose of this article to instruct on how tax
inversions worked in the past and availability may change in the future. Those
who are not students of business organizations or tax law should at least have
general familiarity with the use of business forms to accomplish different legal
ends. For example a partnership may be treated differently for tax purposes
than many corporations which may suffer the problem of being taxed at the
entity and individual shareholder level for a sort of double taxation.
Domestically, some sought new types of business organization forms to
change legal, tax consequences. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Story the Limited
Liability Company: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed Business
Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING
DEVELOPMENTS IN CORPORATE AND PARTNERSHIP TAXATION, 295, 295-315
(Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005). At the international level, it is
not surprising that those dissatisfied with tax consequences associated with
existing U.S. business entities might seek to form entities abroad under
different legal regimes with more favorable tax consequences to shield income
from taxation.
9 See Liz Moyer, Pfizer Deal Strokes Washington Concern Over Tax
Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2015, http://nyti.ms/ISfFiFX (noting proposed
rates might not cover all transactions).
92 Of separate note, it has been suggested that CSR is critically linked to
political theory. See David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social
Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979).
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by the home country will alleviate host countries of sovereignty
concerns raised by extraterritorial regulation.93
For instance, there is a strong history of these concerns in the so-
called North/South context-especially when regulations are
perceived as an imposition on developing nations by developed
nations. Flashpoints for North/South political disputes can be found
through the years. For example, in the wake of decolonization in the
1960s and 1970s, the developing world challenged laws favored by
developed countries as part of the New International Economic
Order.94 While such efforts did not necessarily change established
international norms," an angry host nation's refusal to help a home
nation may be more easily managed than a change in international
law.96
Ultimately, sovereignty concerns by nations are not an occurrence
unique to the 1960s or 1970s. Long before that time, the idea of comity
in international law perhaps reflected a nation's desire to self-limit its
jurisdictional reach to discourage retaliatory extraterritorial
maneuvering by other nations.9 7 And since the 1970s, additional
players have sought to exercise their sovereign muscles with China
being an example."
9 More generally, one should not assume that regulatory requirements
opposed by a home nation will be attractive to the host nation, and conflicts
might ensue. See JOHN DUNNING, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE
GLOBAL EcoNoMY 579-80 (1993).
94 See International Arbitral Tribunal: Award on the Merits in Dispute
Between Texaco Overseas Petrol. Company/California Asiatic Oil Company
and the Government ofthe Libyan Arab Republic, 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1 (1978) (demonstrating a pushback against companies from developed
countries); see also G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), ¶ 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-6/3201
(May 1, 1974).
* See International Arbitral Tribunal, supra note 94.
96 All of this is not to suggest that emerging economies lack their own
CSR concerns; however, those may be uniquely shaped by their own
experiences and situations. See THOMAS POLLAN, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
THE ADMISSION OF FDI 249-50 (2006).
1 See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict:
Resituating International Comity as Conflict ofLaws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv
I1 (2010) (discussing comity).
98 Interestingly, China appears to have its own conceptualization of CSR
and techniques for encouraging it. See Jessica Marie Conrad, The Business of
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Such political realities, at a minimum, should leave the United
States without a full expectation of cooperation in all instances.99
Also, some concern for retaliation against the interests of U.S. expats
in foreign jurisdictions may be warranted.00
2. DOMESTIC POLITICS
While foreign political entities might push back against
extraterritorial regulation, other domestic officials might push back as
well. These officials might include, but are not necessarily limited to,
those generally skeptical of or opposed to foreign involvement. One
of the most prevalent strains of U.S. foreign economic policy is export
promotion.10' To the extent extraterritorial regulation creates a more
difficult environment in host nations for U.S. exports, one might see
pushback against the U.S. regulation at home. From a regulatory
theory perspective, another interesting question is whether the moral
authority of regulation, and resulting compliance, might be diminished
by mixed messages from different parts of the regulatory community.
On a separate front, increased use of extraterritorial regulation
may raise questions about government enforcement resource
allocation in the United States. In an age of budget deficits, some
might question expenditure of resources on enforcing extraterritorial
Business: Comparing Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives in China and
the United States, 41 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 747 (2013).
99 An example from the non-CSR setting of lack of cooperation, for
example, is the difficulty of getting others to join sanction regimes. See, e.g.,
China Rejects New EU Sanctions Against Russia as Counterproductive,
Moscow TIMES, Sept. 1, 2014, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/china-
rejects-new-eu-sanctions-against-russia-as-counterproductive-
3 8909.
100 See, e.g., Laura Saunders, Expats Left Frustrated as Banks Cut
Services Abroad, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2014,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/expats-left-frustrated-as-banks-cut-services-
abroad-1410465182 (describing the problem of U.S. expats securing business
services abroad after money laundering and tax regulations).
101 For example, the Department of Commerce has focused on such
export promotion efforts. E.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A BASIC GUIDE TO
EXPORTING, available at
http://export.gov/basicguide/?utm_source-hero&utmmedium=exportgov%2
0&utm campaign=basicguide (last visited Nov. 24, 2015).
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regulations while potentially neglecting more core regulatory missions
of agencies at home. 102
D. OTHER EFFICACYLIMITS
Beyond politics, it is useful to separately identify another limit of
extraterritorial regulation. The CSR movement is about changing
norms for business operations. It seems that better behavioral norms
and deeper cultural change in host countries are more likely to become
socially-embedded if embraced at the host country level.103
This is also important because poor behavior that flies in the face
of CSR likely involves not only foreign companies, but suspect local
participants, which may include officials receiving bribes or co-
conspirators in bad behavior in the private sector. Thus, the likelihood
of home countries solving all problems through initial jurisdiction over
their companies that also operate abroad is questionable.
E. A NARRATIVE OF SECOND BESTSOLUTIONS?
In light of the above limitations, one must seriously consider
whether a narrative exists about extraterritorial financial regulations to
102 Judge Sporkin himself noted the resource issue forced him to
contemplate FCPA type programs as individual case enforcement became
potentially overwhelming. See Sporkin, supra note 16, at 272.
103 One very useful aspect of the Symposium was extended discussion
about the need to move beyond CSR code words to institute changes that
corporations adopt into their cultures rather than feeling satisfied to file reports
to technically meet legal requirements. Professor Buhmann, for instance,
usefully noted the need to let behavioral norms sit with firms for them to
immerse themselves and more deeply adopt them. Karin Buhmann, Remarks
at the South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business Symposium:
Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets (Feb. 6, 2015).
Professor Aparna Polavarapu further noted the diversity of different places
where one might attempt to institute CSR norms haphazardly without
accounting for different interests, sometimes conflicting, of different
stakeholders. Aparna Polavarapu, Remarks at the South Carolina Journal of
International Law and Business Symposium: Corporate Social Responsibility
in Emerging Markets (Feb. 6, 2015). This further seems to counsel for longer
term, considered change to promote CSR. In part, this is why I offer
techniques below for norm migration and more universal acceptance of a new
corporate citizenship.
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improve CSR as suboptimal, second best solutions. I have utilized this
vantage point,'" as have others, 10 as a way to view and evaluate
regulatory schemes more effectively. In other words, is this
extraterritorial use of financial regulation-an indirect method with
inherent limitations-the optimal method to improve CSR in foreign
jurisdictions when more direct regulatory tools might better
accomplish the task?
IV. ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
In this part of the article, I explore alternative regulatory solutions
to improving CSR beyond the extraterritorial application of home
country financial regulation. In particular, I propose ideas about how
CSR ideals might be harmonized more effectively at the multilateral
level and how host countries might be incentivized to take up the CSR
mantle. 106
A. MULTILA TERAL HARMONIZATION OF IDEALS
Harmonization of CSR regulatory efforts at the multilateral level
potentially offers a more direct means of achieving CSR. It is useful
to divide the discussion of possible harmonization into two sections:
the broader migration of CSR norms to multiple jurisdictions and the
additional harmonization of assessment of what constitutes
achievement of effective CSR.
1. NORM MIGRATION
Nations seeking to encourage certain CSR activities and norms in
other jurisdictions would be well advised to consider potential means
for adoption and enthusiastic enforcement of those norms by public
'" See, e.g., Kenneth M. Rosen, "Who Killed Katie Couric?" and
Other Tales from the World of Executive Compensation Reform, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2907 (2008); Fisch and Rosen, supra note 46 (discussing Sarbanes-
Oxley).
"o See, e.g., Richard G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General
Theory ofSecond Best, 24 REv. EcON. STUD. 11 (1956).
106 While in the constraints ofthis Symposium this only is the beginning
of a dialogue on these alternatives, hopefully future work on CSR will be able
to contemplate them in more detail and policymakers, businesses, and other
stakeholders will be able to use them as they evaluate CSR's future.
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authorities in those jurisdictions. Individual countries unilaterally
seeking to export norms might be viewed as more provocative and
with greater hostility by host jurisdictions. However, if perceived as
part of a multilateral process of consensus building, those norms might
be more palatable.
Moreover, one cannot underestimate difficulties with massive
adoption of norms in a short period of time. As a result, creative
regulatory policymakers might view norm migration as a more gradual
process to spread among nations that takes place over a longer period
of time. Gradual acceptance by additional nations of anti-corruption
and anti-bribery norms reflected in the FCPA illustrates how norm
migration might work.
As previously explained, the FCPA started as an outgrowth of a
particular national experience, the Watergate scandal of the 1970s.07
However, in the ensuing decades anti-bribery norms began to appear
in additional multilateral fora. For example, negotiations at the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
led in 1997 to over thirty nations signing the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions.'" The initial signatories represented many of
the most significant countries for world trade.'" The following year,
the U.S. Senate approved the Convention, and U.S. law was adjusted
to reflect the broader regulatory consensus in the International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.110 Originating in the
1960s, the OECD started with a limited membership of some European
countries, the United States, and Canada.I" By 1997, when the OECD
had twenty-eight members, all but Australia signed the Convention,
along with some nations that were not OECD members, such as
Brazil.'12
107 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
108 See RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 912 (2000).
109 See id.
o10 See id.
." Members and Partners, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
112 See BRAND, supra note 108, at 938.
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By 2014, there were still only thirty-four OECD members.113
Similarities among members in a multilateral organization with a
relatively small group of members may have allowed a starting point
for negotiations of more shared norms and facilitated agreement. Over
time, the OECD membership group grew geographically; and while
including most advanced economies today, the OECD also includes
some emerging countries, like Chile, Mexico, and Turkey. 114 In
addition, the OECD currently emphasizes working with nations with
emerging economies, such as India, China, and Brazil."' The OECD
thus may serve a useful norm migration facilitating function:
establishing agreement on issues such as CSR norms among a smaller
group of important economies and moving forward together to reach
out to other significant economies.116
For anti-corruption agreements, the consensus on norms appears
to be growing. In late 2005, the United Nations Convention against
Corruption (UN Convention) entered into force.I" As of April 2015,
the UN Convention includes 140 signatories. " Of course,
multilateral statements against corruption do not constitute the end of
corrupt behavior. However, getting more nations to affirmatively
endorse anti-corruption norms is a good start. This raises an
interesting issue about the FCPA as well. Perhaps its greatest
achievement is not prosecutions under the statute, but its help in
creating a dialogue on the fight against corruption. In any event, the
corruption regulation story raises interesting questions for
policymakers about regulatory sequencing and the most effective way
113 Members and Partners, supra note 111.
114 Id
115 Id
16 The United States may be becoming more strategic about this. For
example, on the sensitive issue of tax avoidance by multinationals, the OECD
has released recommendations fighting such tax avoidance. OECD Releases
First BEPS Recommendations to G20 for International Approach to Combat
Tax Avoidance By Multinationals, OECD, (Sept. 16, 2014)
http://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-releases-first-beps-recommendations-to-g20-
for-intemational-approach-to-combat-tax-avoidance-by-multinationals.htm.
1' United Nations Convention Against Corruption Signature and
Ratification Status as of 1 April 2015, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME,
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
118 Id.
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to introduce regulations in stages.'9 The latter point suggests another
project that might be undertaken in a multilateral fashion: establishing
consensus on regulatory assessment of pro-CSR regulatory efforts.
2. HARMONIZING STANDARDS FOR REGULATORY ASSESSMENT
Reaching greater multilateral consensus on standards of what
constitutes effective encouragement of CSR would be valuable, so that
policymakers could assess whether various regulatory efforts are
successful, unsuccessful, or mixed bags. Of course, more universal
notions of CSR's basic definition might facilitate the creation of
assessment standards.1 2 0 Indeed, one of the challenges to augmenting
"' It should be noted that anti-corruption is only one example of
possible norm migration as additional CSR goals may migrate. Of note, the
U.N. has been engaging in extensive efforts on a variety of issues beyond
corruption related to corporate behavior and investment. For example, the
U.N.'s Human Rights Council unanimously affirmed principles related to
corporations' relationship to human rights. Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Business and Human Rights, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect,
Respect and Remedy" Framework, U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie); U.S. DEP'T OF ST. BUREAU
OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (2013), available at
http://www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/usg-approach-on-
business-and-human-rights-updatedjune20l3.pdf The United States has
identified one of the benefits of such principles, noting that they may serve "as
a 'floor' rather than a 'ceiling' for a firm's support of human rights. See id.
at 4. Here the norm migration actually also moved in the other direction with
the OECD updating its guidelines in reflection of the principles. See id. at 5;
OECD, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 13-15 (2011),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
Other projects are ongoing. For instance, the United Nations has made
substantial progress on a multi-decade agenda for sustainable development,
another area where corporate social responsibility might be critical. See
Richard L. Field & Ira R. Feldman, The United Nations Post-2015
Development Agenda, INT'L L. NEWS, Winter 2015, at 1.
120 Of course, scholars have attempted to describe a range of competing
views of CSR. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility
in an Era ofEconomic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 705 (2002).
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CSR is a lack of agreement on what CSR specifically is.
121 A clear
definition of CSR not only appears to be lacking for scholars, but also
for policymakers seeking to encourage CSR.
However, universal agreement on a CSR definition should not
stop the commencement of dialogue on methodologies for assessing
activities many would consider to bolster CSR efforts.1 22 In this paper,
I have functionally explained what CSR includes through reference to
specific pro-CSR policies. The assessment of such policies, including
extraterritorial domestic regulation, can certainly begin with
dialogues, even informal ones related to what regulations work well or
are more limited as parties seek to develop consensus on more formal
measures of regulatory outcomes.
Possible fora exist for such dialogues. For instance, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) regularly
hosts the World Investment Forum, which brings together government
leaders, business leaders, and scholars to talk about investing in
sustainable development. 123 The 2014 forum featured a special
multidisciplinary academic conference where scholars sought to create
a research agenda on investment for development.124 Such events
might house efforts to begin to further define possible aspects of CSR
and to assess efforts to achieve CSR. Indeed, after the World
Investment Forum, UNCTAD moved forward with an Investment
Policy Framework for Sustainable Development as a way to help
actual policymaking to proceed that includes a possible corporate
121 See, e.g., Chris MacDonald, Two Problems With CSR, Bus. ETHICS
BLOG (Aug. 8, 2011), http://businessethicsblog.com/2011/08/08/two-
problems-with-csr/ (noting shortcomings of CSR definitions).
122 Indeed, even if notions of the contents of CSR change, evolving
perceptions are still part of a long-term recognition of the need for
international businesses to accept social norms. See POLLAN, supra note 96, at
248.
123 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Forum,
WORLD INVESTMENT F., http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/about (last
visited Dec. 6, 2015).
124 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Programme, WORLD
INVESTMENT F., http://unctad-worldinvestmentforum.org/switzerland20l4/
programme/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).
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role.125 Such framework documents might provide a standard against
which government policies ultimately might be measured.
Of course, the challenges of achieving broad, multilateral
consensus on assessment and other matters begs the question of what
other regulatory steps might be taken to augment CSR, including host
country regulation.
B. INCENTIVIZE HOST REGULA TION
To encourage companies to behave better and to contribute to
communities, interested nations should explore ways to encourage and
incentivize host countries themselves to take up the challenge of
encouraging CSR. Possible methods for accomplishing this goal
include sharing resources and using transparency to align public and
private sector norms for CSR behavior.
1. SHARED RESOURCES
Encouraging host country efforts to improve CSR might start with
home countries sharing regulatory resources. Initially, this could
include technical assistance regarding effective regulatory design.
Regulatory design in this area is a challenge, and nations might benefit
from sharing experiences of what they have found to be effective and
ineffective.
The SEC provides a possible model for such assistance with its
International Technical Assistance Program.126 Through this program,
the SEC hosts market development and enforcement raining institutes
in Washington, D.C. each year.'27 The SEC also plans regional and
bilateral training abroad as well.128 In addition to training, the SEC
125 See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Investment Policy
Framework for Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5 (Dec. 23, 2015), http://unctad.org/en/
PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015 d5en.pdf.
126 See Securities and Exchange Commission's International Technical
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provides confidential assessments to its global counterparts'
regulatory efforts.12 9
Of course, one of the keys to effective technical assistance is
recognition that the effectiveness of particular regulatory programs
may hinge on the specific needs and natures of different jurisdictions.
Thus, for assistance providers, humility is critical. Accordingly, the
technical assistance provider must recognize that her jurisdiction's
regulatory fix is not always best for all jurisdictions.
In addition to sharing knowledge resources, financial resources
also can be important in supporting foreign programs to encourage
CSR. In tough financial times, some reluctance might accompany
requests to share such resources. However, in some instances, home
country regulators may want to assess if financial assistance to foreign
regulatory programs may be less costly and more effective than
funding home country efforts through extraterritorial regulations. An
excellent example of this is monitoring corporate activities abroad for
illicit behavior inconsistent with CSR.'10 Eyes on the ground in host
country jurisdictions might sight problems more easily than home
countries.
2. TRANSPARENCY AND ALIGNMENT OF PRIVATE SECTOR NORMS
The CSR experience to date raises another possible way to help
host jurisdictions support CSR. Corporations increasingly see CSR as
a way to market themselves to others. Thus, one would expect a
jurisdiction's creation of an environment that facilitates positive CSR
and that can easily be explained to others to attract private sector
investment.'31 Host jurisdictions should be encouraged to show their
efforts to promote an environment of CSR as a way to attract
investment from foreign corporations. 132
129 Id
13o See supra Part III.
1 More generally, government environments for doing international
business, especially given risks involved, are recognized. See WITOLD JERZY
HENISZ, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (2002).
132 One of the Symposium's greatest revelations was a firm's desire to
be better corporate citizens backed up by the institution of actual internal
policies to encourage such a role. For instance, Peter Selleck of Michelin's
keynote address aptly illustrated this point. Peter Selleck, Keynote Address at
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Outsiders may incentivize and augment a host jurisdiction's
explanation of its CSR environment. It is no surprise that one of the
World Bank's significant annual projects is its Doing Business Report,
in which experts from around the world help the World Bank Group
assess and communicate the regulatory environment for businesses in
different nations.'33 In these evaluations, future reports might include
references to national comfort with and regulatory encouragement of
CSR. This might be a vehicle for countries to attract corporations
through positive assessment of their behavioral environments. When
government and firm cultures indicate to each other shared goals and
efforts to attain them, perhaps the world will be on the path to more
sustainable, long-term cultures in both the private and public sectors
supporting CSR.
V. CONCLUSION
As explained above, the United States historically has applied
financial regulation as a home country to activities of its companies
operating abroad and in a way the U.S. hopes will encourage positive
behavior by those companies. Without immediately rejecting all such
extraterritorial regulatory efforts, it is important to recognize that such
efforts' efficacy ultimately might be limited.
Accordingly, I have suggested some possible limitations and
additional regulatory efforts that might more directly address the
desire to enhance the CSR efforts of businesses around the world.
Hopefully, future CSR discussions will utilize this model for a more
thorough relative assessment of CSR-enhancing efforts.
the South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business Symposium:
Corporate Social Responsibility in Emerging Markets (Feb. 5, 2015).
In addition, more study is needed on how firms might use private
mechanisms to more directly attain needed CSR program inputs in a world of
multiple players engaging in more complex production activities without a
global regulatory policy. This was explained well by Professor Kish Parella's
contribution to the Symposium. Kish Parella, Remarks at the South Carolina
Journal of International Law and Business Symposium: Corporate Social
Responsibility in Emerging Markets (Feb. 6, 2015).
m3 See Doing Business, WORLD BANK GROUP,
http://www.doingbusiness.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
